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“Perhaps it is money that expresses the distinction between the two societies best.” This 
statement from Deleuze’s (1992: 5) famous “Postscript on the Societies of Control” (first 
published in French, cf. Deleuze 1990) should be taken seriously. Much has been made 
of the implications of this essay, especially for the description of contemporary digital 
culture: e.g., tracking as an example of the “control mechanism, giving the position of any 
element within an open environment at any given instant” (ibid.: 7). The central role of 
money and Deleuze’s specific ideas regarding the transformation of capitalism in (or 
as?) ‘societies of control’ have received comparatively little attention. Seb Franklin 
(2015: 3-10) has already discussed Deleuze’s famous essay in relation to questions of 
socio-economic order, but he did not explicitly discuss the role of money. This is all the 
more surprising if we consider that Deleuze called himself a Marxist: “I think Félix Guat-
tari and I have remained Marxists, in our two different ways, perhaps, but both of us. 
You see, we think any political philosophy must turn on the analysis of capitalism and 
the ways it has developed” (Deleuze 1995: 171). Among others, Choat (2010: 125-55) 
has underlined that Deleuze’s thought was always very close to Marx (cf. also Tho-
burn 2003). It is therefore not surprising that Deleuze assigns money an important role 
in the description of control societies. 
 In the following essay, I will analyze the Postscript’s dense and sometimes enigmatic 
passages on money and capitalism, seeking to relate them to different theoretical and 
historical approaches to the subject. By doing this, I hope to draw a clearer picture of 
what ‘societies of control’ mean for the ongoing discussion about ‘capitalism’ – and vice 
versa. This essay is part of my recent research, in which I seek to better understand the 
role that money plays in different theoretical discourses, such as Actor-Network-Theory 
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 Regarding money, Deleuze writes:  
Perhaps it is money that expresses the distinction between the two societies best, 
since discipline always referred back to minted money that locks gold in as numer-
ical standard, while control relates to floating rates of exchange, modulated accord-
ing to a rate established by a set of standard currencies. (Deleuze 1992: 5)  
This sentence is complicated to say the least. Deleuze argues that ‘discipline always re-
ferred back to minted money that locks gold in as numerical standard.’ Historically, this 
is true if we locate disciplinary society in the 19th and early 20th century.1 This was the 
period when the gold standard was central, and even though it was already effectively 
abandoned after WW I, the standard ultimately ended only with the collapse of the Bret-
ton Woods regime in 1973 (cf. Hardach/Hartig 1998). Deleuze obviously refers to these 
circumstances when he argues that ‘control relates to floating rates of exchange, modu-
lated according to a rate established by a set of standard currencies.’ After the collapse 
of the Bretton Woods regime, the set of fixed exchange rates between currencies with 
reference to the dollar (which was tied to gold) was given up in favour of ‘floating rates 
of exchange.’ Deleuze surely does not intend to say that the transformation from disci-
plinary society to control society is strictly tied to that monetary transformation, be-
cause this would mean that the transition would have taken place exactly in March 1973 
– and that all of a sudden, disciplinary institutions like schools would have disappeared 
or been dispersed throughout society.  
 The relation between economic history and the two formations described by 
Deleuze, then, seems to have a wider meaning. Money, Deleuze argues, expresses the 
distinction between the two forms of societies best – but in which sense? That people in 
disciplinary society are on a trajectory through family, school, barracks, factories etc. 
seems to not be related to the question of whether or not monetary value is tied to gold. 
But Deleuze claims that ‘discipline always referred back to minted money that locks gold 
in as numerical standard’ (my emphasis). Is this because the gold standard can be un-
derstood as a kind of ‘disciplining’ of money? Moreover, why should especially ‘minted 
money’ be related to gold, if – before 1973 – the same was of course (and even especial-
ly) true for paper money as well?2 
 
                                                        
1 This is just a working hypothesis: It is far from clear whether it is plausible to establish a clear 
succession from disciplinary societies to societies of control. 
2 There are two ways in which the value of money can be related to gold: One is the material 
value – this applies to minted money, insofar as it is made of gold itself and carries no nominal 
value; but there are no modern currencies to which this applies. The other is the gold standard, 
meaning that every currency-token – be it minted, or paper, or whatever – can be exchanged for 
a defined quota of gold. Deleuze can only mean the latter. 
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 Deleuze proceeds to argue:  
Types of machines are easily matched with each type of society – not that ma-
chines are determining, but because they express those social forms capable of 
generating them and using them. The old societies of sovereignty made use of sim-
ple machines – levers, pulleys, clocks; but the recent disciplinary societies 
equipped themselves with machines involving energy, with the passive danger of 
entropy and the active danger of sabotage; the societies of control operate with 
machines of a third type, computers, whose passive danger is jamming and whose 
active one is piracy and the introduction of viruses. (1992: 6)3 
This closely resembles a famous and controversial quote by Marx: “The hand-mill gives 
you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill society with the industrial capital-
ist.” (1955: 122) However, there seems to be a crucial difference: While for Deleuze the 
machines ‘express’ a social formation that ‘generates’ them, for Marx the machines ‘give’ 
a particular social formation, embodied in social roles like ‘the feudal lord’ or ‘the indus-
trial capitalist.’ It may seem, then, that Marx is more of a technological determinist than 
Deleuze.4 Yet, Marx’s concept of technology is more complex than a simple determinism 
(cf. MacKenzie 1984; Wendling 2009), and even the seemingly clear quote on the hand-
mill and the steam-mill turns out to be more complex when read in context (cf. Rosen-
berg 1976: 74). I cannot delve further into this discussion at this point – the most I can 
say is that Deleuze identifies a problem which is also characteristic for Marx’s discourse, 
namely the relations between social forms and technology. He formulates this in a man-
ner that resonates with Actor-Network-Theory: “But the machines don't explain any-
thing, you have to analyze the collective apparatuses of which the machines are just one 
component.” (Deleuze 1995: 175) 
 Interestingly enough, it seems to be the same with money, as it ‘expresses the dis-
tinction between the two societies best:’ The technologies ‘express’ the social forms – 
disciplinary society ‘equips itself’ with ‘machines involving energy,’ say, the steam-mill, 
while societies of control ‘operate with machines of a third type, computers.’ But: Just as 
it is not easy to understand why disciplinary order should ‘refer’ to the gold standard, it 
is also not easy to grasp why disciplinary society should be tied to a certain type of ma-
chines: A prison is a prison, regardless of whether your economy works predominantly 
with machines based on energy or with those based on information – and prisons are 
very much in use, especially in the US, where information technology abounds as well. 
                                                        
3 Cf. also Deleuze 1995: 175: “One can of course see how each kind of society corresponds to a 
particular kind of machine – with simple mechanical machines corresponding to sovereign soci-
eties, thermodynamic machines to disciplinary societies, cybernetic machines and computers to 
control societies.” 
4 In his book on Foucault, Deleuze explicitly states that “the machines are social before being 
technical.” (1988: 39) 
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To be sure, there might be a historical and contingent coexistence between different 
forms of discipline or control and certain types of machines – but is there more to it? In 
the case of the societies of control the connection is more plausible, because the much 
quoted ‘control mechanism, giving the position of any element within an open environ-
ment at any given instant,’ the process of “continual monitoring” (Deleuze 1995: 175), 
seems to be possible solely with digital network technologies (think of smartphones, 
etc.). Deleuze argues that the connection consists of ‘social forms capable of generating 
[…] and using’ certain machines: if a control society structurally needs positional control 
about an element in an open environment, it might select network technologies that are 
able to do that. Let’s read on:  
This technological evolution must be, even more profoundly, a mutation of capital-
ism, an already well-known or familiar mutation that can be summed up as fol-
lows: nineteenth-century capitalism is a capitalism of concentration, for produc-
tion and for property. It therefore erects the factory as a space of enclosure, the 
capitalist being the owner of the means of production but also, progressively, the 
owner of other spaces conceived through analogy (the worker’s familial house, the 
school). As for markets, they are conquered sometimes by specialization, some-
times by colonization, sometimes by lowering the costs of production. (Deleuze 
1992: 6)  
It becomes clearer that disciplinary society, and this argument is of course close to simi-
lar arguments made by Michel Foucault, is necessary for a certain form of capitalism, 
producing certain closed and confining spaces, disciplining the bodies of workers (for 
example by using Taylorist methods in factories). But even from this passage it does not 
become evident why this operation should, firstly, be tied to the gold standard and, sec-
ondly, to energy-transforming machines (the factory discipline, the energy transforming 
machines and the gold standard might indeed form a contingent ‘collective apparatus’). 
A convincing example would perhaps be the Fordist assembly line as a kind of techno-
logical organization of work in factories, which connects the disciplined, Taylorised bod-
ies to the rhythm of the machinery. Of course, one could say that the assembly line is an 
energy-transforming machine insofar as it is powered with steam and channels the 
movements of the workers (but the Taylorist discipline of the body is also an informa-
tional process). 
 Perhaps the argument becomes clearer if we contrast it with the following para-
graph, in which Deleuze again describes the societies of control:  
But, in the present situation, capitalism is no longer involved in production, which 
it often relegates to the Third World, even for the complex forms of textiles, metal-
lurgy, or oil production. It’s a capitalism of higher-order production. It no longer 
buys raw materials and no longer sells the finished products: it buys the finished 
products or assembles parts. What it wants to sell is services and what it wants to 
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buy is stocks. This is no longer a capitalism for production but for the product, 
which is to say, for being sold or marketed. (1992: 6) 
This seems to be a correct description of contemporary capitalism: Many companies 
outsource material production into countries in the global south, while services and 
marketing become the central industries in the rich countries, and ‘financialization’ is a 
dominant mode of capital accumulation. These traits had already been extensively dis-
cussed (e.g. the ‘postindustrial society’ by Alain Touraine in 1969) when Deleuze pub-
lished his famous article in 1990 and thus were not genuine discoveries made by him. 
Something else is irritating as well: It seems that disciplinary society is not at all suc-
ceeded and superseded by societies of control – the point, rather, is that disciplinary 
society is outsourced to the global south, where ‘the factory as a space of enclosure’ is a 
very harsh, real working condition for many men, women and even children, producing 
the shiny ‘control mechanism, giving the position of any element within an open envi-
ronment at any given instant,’ as for example an Apple iPhone (cf. Sandoval 2015). In 
this sense, disciplinary society is the infrastructure of the society of control. Although 
the question of whether societies of control really follow (even if in a slow and gradual 
transition) after disciplinary societies, or if these two forms, in a way, coexist, is dis-
cussed in the existing literature; as far as I can see, the question of whether the distribu-
tion between disciplinary and control society coincides (at least roughly) with the dif-
ference between the global north and the global south is hardly ever raised. 
 Moving on to the next paragraph: 
[Contemporary capitalism, J. S.] is essentially dispersive, and the factory has given 
way to the corporation. The family, the school, the army, the factory are no longer 
the distinct analogical spaces that converge towards an owner – state or private 
power – but coded figures – deformable and transformable – of a single corpora-
tion that now has only stockholders. Even art has left the spaces of enclosure in or-
der to enter into the open circuits of the bank. (Deleuze 1992: 6) 
This also is a convincing observation: Everything is subject to statistical procedures. 
Rankings and similar forms are everywhere (cf. e.g. Mau 2017), and so everything is – at 
least in principle – measurable and quantifiable and thus connectable in one way or an-
other to the logic of economic value (which is the principle of abstract quantities per se). 
Everything (including universities) becomes subjected to the logic of the corporation, 
meaning: everything has to be (at least potentially) profitable. Capitalism is indeed be-
coming ‘dispersive,’ because the ‘control mechanism, giving the position of any element 
within an open environment at any given instant’ actually does not only give the ‘posi-
tion’ of any element, but analyses the element, collects data and – if appropriate – targets 
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the element with advertising and so forth.5 Every mobile point can in principle be con-
nected to the “joys of marketing” (Deleuze 1992: 7). “Individuals have become ‘dividu-
als,’ and masses, samples, data, markets, or ‘banks.’” (ibid.: 5).6 Only art seems to face a 
new kind of enclosure: It has left the disciplinary space of the museum, but its insertion 
into the ‘circuits of the bank’ leads to a new kind of invisibility in freeport-storage.7 The 
fundamental invisibility of the abstract money of the society of control, no longer tied 
(phantasmatically) to gold, seems to erase the visibility of art itself. 
 So, Deleuze continues: 
The conquests of the market are made by grabbing control and no longer by disci-
plinary training, by fixing the exchange rate much more than by lowering costs, by 
transformation of the product more than by specialization of production. Corrup-
tion thereby gains a new power. (1992: 6) 
Deleuze is right: Since every element in an open environment can be tracked and ana-
lysed, capitalism can seize control of the unconscious, that is, of unstructured and unar-
ticulated desires – it is not necessary to format desire (via advertisement) anymore to 
make it compatible to supply. However, we have to ask: why is the computer industry 
going to such lengths to place individualized advertisements? And why are there phe-
nomena like self-tracking – certainly a “frightful continual training” (Deleuze 1995: 175), 
which seems to be an internalized continuation of disciplinary training? Moreover: Low-
ering costs is of course still a central operation of capitalism, especially through the 
aforementioned outsourcing of ‘factory enclosures’ into the global south – and it is hard 
to understand what it might mean that the central capitalist operation of today is ‘fixing 
the exchange rate.’ If this refers to exchange rates between different currencies, then it is 
not correct, because exchange rates fluctuate with global market processes. It is also not 
quite clear what Deleuze means when he says that the ‘transformation of the product’ 
takes the place of the ‘specialization of production,’ since market differentiation is clear-
ly a trait of recent capitalism… 
 Be that as it may: 
Marketing has become the center or the ‘soul’ of the corporation. We are taught 
that corporations have a soul, which is the most terrifying news in the world. The 
                                                        
5 And this can also be put to political uses, as the ‘social scoring’ in China shows. 
6 Cf. Franklin 2015: 9: “In short, the dividual is the subject digitized. And control is the episteme 
of the dividual.” 
7 Cf. Heidenreich 2016: “It is safe to say, however, that never before now have so many artworks 
been produced to remain hidden, all enclosed in disenchanted wooden boxes, suspended in a 
permanent circuit of exchange, in a place called a ‘freeport’ because it is free of customs duties 
and taxes of all kinds. Since no one is allowed to see the art, it is also free of audience and specta-
tors, an anti-theatron; it is a place of un-seeing.”  
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operation of markets is now the instrument of social control and forms the impu-
dent breed of our masters. (Deleuze 1992: 6) 
This is a paragraph that is not easy to understand. It starts with a plausible observation: 
Marketing has become central, at least in the sense that everything transposed into the 
commodity form has to compete. Every university, every ‘individual’ etc. now takes on 
the form of the market. Facebook is the site for individuals to present themselves as 
original, individual, funny; Facebook is a machine for self-marketing, in order to com-
pete with others. Hence, marketing is the central cultural technique of our times. The 
statement ‘corporations have a soul, which is the most terrifying news in the world’ may 
not only mean that a specific corporation has a corporate identity – we may even read 
this as meaning that nowadays every person, having a ‘soul,’ is turned into a corporation 
(in German there is the phrase ‘Ich-AG,’ meaning ‘I-corporation’ or more literally ‘I-
stock-company’). This is indeed ‘the most terrifying news in the world,’ insofar as the 
very core of subjectivity is already subjected to the logic of the market. And thus, it is 
absolutely correct to analyse the market as the main ‘instrument of social control.’ The 
phrase ‘impudent breed of our masters’ clearly addresses the point that the selection of 
the markets prefers the most ruthless characters – but it is important to underline 
Deleuze’s point that the markets ‘form’ these characters. It is not the other way around, 
in the sense that people are in themselves egoistic and ruthless, only looking out for 
their own interests, and that therefore markets are the natural result of every human 
society (as our dominant ideology would have it). 
 Finally, Deleuze writes: “Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover, but 
also continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long duration, infinite and dis-
continuous.” (1992: 6) Deleuze emphasizes firstly the permanent acceleration inherent 
to capitalism, an argument that also concurs with Marx: 
The more that the circulation metamorphoses of capital are only ideal, i.e. the clos-
er the circulation time comes to zero, the more capital functions, and the greater is 
its productivity and self-valorization. If a capitalist works to order, receives pay-
ment on the delivery of his product, and is paid in his own means of production, 
then his time of circulation approaches zero. (Marx 1992: 203)8 
This fundamental accelerative tendency of capital is indeed one of the main reasons why 
control societies ‘operate with machines of a third type, computers,’ because the pro-
cessing of information can be very much accelerated – and the faster an entity can pro-
cess information, the more likely it is to win the permanent molecular war called ‘mar-
                                                        
8 Virilio’s (2006) permanent insistence on acceleration is obviously based on the need of capital 
to reduce its circulation time to zero. 
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ket competition.’9 Since capital has an intrinsic tendency to accelerate, it tends to pro-
duce crises of control, and its acceleration might destabilize societal structures and pro-
duce resistance (the ‘passive danger of entropy and the active danger of sabotage’). In 
fact, James Beniger introduced the notion of control already four years before Deleuze 
published the Postscript; in his pathbreaking study The Control Revolution, Beniger ar-
gued that the emergence of ‘machines of a third type, computers’ was directly related to 
a crisis of control, already beginning in the 19th century, when the ever-accelerating 
forces of capital produced one ‘control crisis’ after the other. This is exactly what 
Deleuze sees as one of the important features of Marxian theory: “What we find most 
interesting in Marx is his analysis of capitalism as an immanent system that’s constantly 
overcoming its own limitations, and then coming up against them once more in a broad-
er form, because its fundamental limit is Capital itself.” (1995: 171) Deleuze insists – and 
this is a highly important aspect completely absent e.g. from Franklin (2015) – that the 
structural crisis of capital necessitates the overcoming of capitalism – otherwise the ‘au-
tomatic subject’ (Marx) of capital would destroy all life on earth. Deleuze states this ex-
plicitly: 
Man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt. It is true that capitalism has re-
tained as a constant the extreme poverty of three quarters of humanity, too poor 
for debt, too numerous for confinement: control will not only have to deal with 
erosions of frontiers but with the explosions within shanty towns or ghettos. 
(1992: 6-7) 
Although he does not speak of ecological disaster, he speaks of the embarrassing fact 
that although capitalism becomes ever more productive, it produces ever more debt 
(think of the so-called ‘financial crisis’ and the resulting extreme debt of all, especially 
the southern, states in Europe) as well as poverty and inequality, because it produces 
what Marx called a ‘relative surplus population’ by the ever accelerating development of 
productive forces.10 We can see the auto-destructive crisis of capital – and therefore of 
all life on earth – right now, right before our eyes (for radical readings of crisis theory in 
the context of the so-called ‘critique of value,’ cf. Larsen et al. 2014). 
 Deleuze’s important discovery of the transition from disciplinary to control societies 
can be summed up as a concentrated description of the last stage of capitalism, in which 
the permanent crisis is so overwhelming that only totalitarian regimes of dividual con-
trol (some of them called ‘social media’) can – for a while – stabilize world society before 
                                                        
9 With this in view, the emergence of recent theoretical tendencies like ‘accelerationism’ is not 
surprising. 
10 There is a recent discussion, however, on whether the developments of the last years show a 
reduction of global poverty. The complex discussions on the recent developments of global and 
digital capitalism are not easy to sum up (cf. Staab 2019). 
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total ecological, economic and political collapse (see the recent emergence of fascism all 
over the world), while the still necessary material production is outsourced to terroristic 
regimes of neo-sovereign or neo-disciplinary societies in the global south. That money 
expresses the transition to crisis-control ‘best’ (as Deleuze argues) makes sense if one 
interprets the collapse of the gold standard as an expression of economic crisis:  
The astounding process in which not only products are devalued in competition, 
but also money itself, across the whole society and worldwide, has a very simple 
cause: the fact that with the monstrous development of technological productivity, 
material wealth can no longer be expressed in the money commodity of gold. Until 
World War I there was still a universal gold standard, that is to say that the bank-
notes of all important industrialized countries could be directly converted into 
gold. Since then, material productivity has exceeded the money commodity, gold, 
to an ever-increasing extent. The umbilical cord of the gold standard was finally 
cut at the start of the 1970s with the abandonment of the Bretton Woods system 
— that is, even the dollar, the global currency, was irreversibly decoupled from the 
gold standard. But this means nothing other than the successive suspension of 
money as a commodity, for paper money, released in volumes with no gold back-
ing, no longer contains any real substance of value, with the single exception of the 
negligible amount of labor involved in its manufacture. This has come to hold uni-
versally for paper money, and also for money that exists purely for the purposes of 
accounting, and all the more so for the fantastic and purely juridical creations out 
of nothing such as the artificial world money of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 
of the International Monetary Fund, which can only circulate between the central 
banks. But the disappearance of the substance value of money only reflects the 
overall tendency for value to disappear, the fact that material production goes be-
yond the limits of value. (Kurz in: Larsen et al. 2014: 55; cf. also 189-93)  
Societies of control are the societies in which computers in different forms (robotics, 
simulation, networks, artificial intelligence etc.) control production and at the same time 
erase value. This conflict between the digital forces of production and its social forms 
leads to economic crises and renders the gold standard obsolete. If we remember 
Deleuze’s argument ‘Types of machines are easily matched with each type of society – 
not that machines are determining, but because they express those social forms capable 
of generating them and using them,’ then this should surprise us: When computers are 
‘generated’ and ‘used’ by control-capitalism, how can a crisis resulting from the conflict 
between the digital productive forces and the capitalist social form – the reduction of 
necessary labour – come about? Deleuze only imagines as ‘passive danger […] jamming,’ 
and ‘piracy and the introduction of viruses’ as active dangers. Perhaps Deleuze has no 
appropriate notion of crisis that could explain why control societies today – regardless 
of the existence of flexible control – turn more and more to fascism (after the big crisis in 
2008). 
 Societies of control may well be the last stage before ecological disaster and global 
fascism – but there might still be a chance: “The key thing may be to create vacuoles of 
  
 
Coils of the Serpent 5 (2020): 66-76 
 
75 Schröter: Money, Technology and Capitalism 
noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control.” (Deleuze 1995: 175) If 
we can disrupt the regime of affirmation and permanent communication, we might also 
disrupt the self-communication of capital. With a conservative or right-wing ‘politics of 
affirmation,’ however, we will only end up with fascism – we thus need a radical critique 
of the seemingly natural forces of money, markets and the state. In this sense, computers 
should be freed from the ‘social forms capable of generating them and using them’ and 
should be turned into instruments of new forms of social and economic coordination (cf. 
Kathöfer/Schröter 2019; Morozov 2019). 
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